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This post is to explain the current situation going on with @xeldal. If you follow me, you probably notice I rarely post these days.
As a general rule, I don't leave comments or respond to comment regarding my downvotes. This isn't because I'm an asshole and I don't care. The reason I have found no matter what I say, I am always wrong and they are always right. No amount of discussion will change this, so I just don't bother. Typically these discussions go on for ages and never come to a logical resolution.
I have been getting tons of notifications on F.R.I.D.A.Y. regarding downvotes and @xeldal upvotes most of which are comments that are various degrees of inaccurate and rather than respond to all these comments, I am writing this post to explain the situation and provide context and clarity to what is going on.
If you are completely oblivious, you can either ignore this post, or read more to understand. It's not really that interesting, but I think it's a good idea to get it out there so people know what is actually going on rather than make up their own versions.
Grab your favorite drink, and most comfortable chair and have a seat. I need to setup some context before we get into this.
I have been curating on this blockchain for years and have been voting over 200 unique authors a week with a similar 10% upvote from my accounts. Many of the people I upvoted were not popular and did not get large upvotes.
I 10% upvote ranged from $5-10 depending on the price of Hive. I felt this was a good size upvote to reward users I felt put in the effort regardless of how I felt about what they wrote about. I am not a big fan of dropping massive upvotes to a handful of blessed users.
I had my own mental algorithm that I used to decide who I voted for and who I didn't, but the biggest factor was my arbitrary decision on how much effort a user put in. I was not influenced by any third party on what I would vote on and asking me for votes was a sure way to not get them.
Another piece of context I would like to mention is a personal challenge I had when I got here. I am not an author, I have published some blogs and I do type a lot of content daily but not in the form of blog posts. When I got here, I decided I would publish something every day for a year. This was back in 2017 and something I continued to do long after the 365 days passed. For the longest time I used to joke I was publishing in a blackhole as no one saw or read it. I am no stranger to social media or marketing, and I know how long it takes to build an audience and how consistency is one of the biggest ingredients. Long after the 365 days one of the biggest reasons I continued publishing despite the obvious fact I don't really need the rewards is for a few reasons.
First, I wanted to set an example.
Second I wanted to provide more content for search engines and future users to make Hive more relevant to the outside world.
Finally, I a lot of the content I published was teaching in nature, either development or the technical aspects of Hive. Many of my most popular posts are things like my deep dive on Markdown, my posts that explain commonly misunderstood concepts on Hive like curation rewards, and my posts talking about things people really don't want to talk about.
Since I have been here I have spent an embarrassing amount of time fighting abuse and countering users taking advantage of the reward pool. I have discovered and broken bot nets with thousands of accounts and users who were farming hundreds of dollars worth of rewards a day. This in fact was a large part of what I did for the first 4 years here.
I know right now, these two things don't make a lot of sense to why they are important and they really are not, but I want you to understand I was a very consistent curator and content producer. I think most people know at least some extent of the anti-abuse efforts I have done, regardless if they agree or disagree with it.
So why is this my last post and what does this have to do with all the current chatter about @xeldal?
To explain that, I got to rewind the clock to over a year ago, when I first discovered @newsflash (transisto) voting on an automated posting account by @brianoflondon called @no-agenda.art.
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This account published 20+ posts a day in a similar style of this one. Basically a title, an image, and copy/paste footer.
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While these posts are harmless on their own, when they get voted for over $100, it becomes a problem.
For example this post received a $84 upvote by @newsflash.
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[IMAGE: https://files.peakd.com/file/peakd-hive/themarkymark/23tRvSfCFnHH5LvMViKSUoXCLGvGkqLyn9Suromj6r8xy2EURQHh8HGVxKmEQnV7xScpy.png]
I stepped in and started downvoting these posts when I noticed consistent large votes on them many times a day. This angered @newsflash (aka Grumpycat, Transisto) in which he responded by downvoting everything I published to $0 and downvoting anything I upvoted as well.
At this point, I stopped curating and was forced to just upvote the hbd stablizer account so others wouldn't get downvotes because of this, and he wouldn't wipe out all my curation rewards because of his temper tantrum due to not being able to farm easy curation rewards without actually helping out authors.
This went on for almost a year where I couldn't curate or publish until. @newflash recently powered down his stake a few months ago and bought some HBD and sold some? Before this happened though, enter the current @xeldal situation.
About 9-10 months ago, I noticed the account @tdvtv publishing 40 posts a day and receiving $500+ across 30-40+ posts a day. Most of these posts are not his, many were duplicate posts, and most posts from other users who already received rewards for the exact same posts.
I started downvoting these posts, and as @xeldal (and his other account/friend @enki) was the largest voter, they responded in a similar fashion as @transisto and started to nuke all my posts and all my upvotes to $0. At this point I wasn't publishing much as @newsflash was already zeroing out all my posts and upvotes, but I would occassional put up easy posts as bait for them to waste their downvotes.
@kencode who runs the site that powers the account @tdvtv has contacted me on multiple occasions about these downvotes. At some point changes were made because of these downvotes to set many of the posts from the @tdvtv account to decline rewards if a user didn't claim the post. This prevented some of the problems with @tdvtv, but didn't stop @xeldal from trying to punish me for getting invovled.
Recently @kencode left some comments saying I am being unfair and I am harming users which he has been telling people for some time. He has accused me for being a criminal for downvoting these posts and how despicable I am.
I thought this was ironic as @kencode contacted me back in January expressing concerns that he feels the owner (Jeff, aka Dollar Vigilante) may be a pedophile and his wife and kids may be in danger and he is concerned. I told him to contact authorities and he said in Mexico there really arn't any.
Both xeldal/enki and newsflash followed my upvotes to the hbd stablizer, but since there are so many voters and posts, their downvotes really had little impact. But I am left with no choice and I am unable to curate freely.
For a full year I tolerated this malicious and childish behavior from two large whales who had no ethics or maturity. After about a year, I decided I would return the favor they granted to me and started to downvote their upvotes.
A portion of these large upvotes were on shitty low quality content. @xeldal was following some large curators and over time I believe his votes to these curators increased but for the most part I noticed they followed specific accounts and just ran on auto pilot.
Around April I started to counter these upvotes, and managed to reduce his curation rewards to below 2% APR, far less than the typical 8-9% of a quality curator.
Despite what most people think, I don't like downvoting. I don't do it because I enjoy it or for my benefit. I have noticed many believe I receive some sort of reward when I downvote, or those rewards go to me or increase my earnings. Even if I was posting, and I downvoted something for $100, I would likely see less than $0.01 flow back to my post due to the reward returning to the reward pool. 99% of the time when I downvote, it is for Hive and not for myself.
I have deep regrets of getting into anti-abuse in the first place, it has made my time here fairly miserable and has had no benefit to me. I don't have a proposal for it, I don't get paid doing it, and it has caused endless headaches. I mostly stopped doing anti-abuse awhile ago but I still downvote real obvious cases but I am mostly out of it. I will downvote abuse as I see it, because I still care about Hive and willing to stick my neck out doing so but I don't spend time trying to find it like I used to.
So here we are today, the situation is pretty much the same, but more and more people are leaving comments many of which making false accusations or don't know the full story.
I see no point and posting, every post and every project I work on gets nuked. I have no incentive to work on projects as once they are discovered to be mine, get nuked as well. I no longer have any choice in what I curate.
Lots of people have saying I am the bad guy here and my downvotes are evil and I am hurting Hive users. The fact I stopped voting users over a year ago, has prevented thousands of downvotes a month. I have little to no choice in what I can do, I chose to take it on the chin for over a year so no one else would be pulled into it. I have reached out to @xeldal and explain he and Hive users are the primarily ones getting hurt here.
You can take this and do what you want with it. I am getting endless notifications on F.R.I.D.A.Y. with comments that are completely inaccurate or unaware of why this is happening. I want no part of this, but I wasn't going to let users farm of duplicate and content that wasn't theirs. Especially at the scale it was happening.
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Posted Using LeoFinance Alpha
Once again, I do thank you for your engagement.
And, yes, I do agree that we disagree. My goal here, though, is to discern and discover some meaningful feasible space wherein we do agree, or at least where we can agree.
> A single whale CAN nuke SOME posts.
On this, we both agree.
> But they have to prioritize which posts, and that's consensus. The ones they're nuking do not have consensus. The others that necessarily survive with successful payouts are consensus.
So what you're saying here is that any post that gets passed over by 'any and all whale DVs' has thusly received the consensus blessing of all whales and thus is allowed to bathe in the HIVE inflation reward pool.
I think it's important that we define our terms. When I use the term 'consensus', this is what I mean:
> Consensus decision making is a creative and dynamic way of reaching agreement between all members of a group. ... [A] group using consensus is committed to finding solutions that everyone actively supports, or at least can live with. This ensures that all opinions, ideas and concerns are taken into account.
(italics added) Source
Given that definition (which you are, of course, free to disagree with), one could say that a form of consensus is being reached on those posts that are passed over. However, one cannot say that any form of consensus is being reached on those posts that are being nuked. Consensus is thwarted because there is no viable (i.e. sustainable) mechanism wherein dissenting voices (i.e. those who believe a nuked post DOES warrant a portion of the reward pool) can have their "opinions ideas and concerns ... taken into account."
In other words, we do not have consensus on the overall distribution of the reward pool. What we have is a semblance of consensus that, in reality, gives unchecked veto power to each and every whale. Each and every whale is free to single out individual accounts and/or ideas that they dislike, and completely and totally remove them from participation in the reward pool.
And, whereas other whales are essentially defenseless in combatting the unilateral nuking of individual accounts and/or ideas, this enables each whale who chooses to exercise this power to systematically eliminate his/her enemies by simply being focused and persistent.
This is exemplified by the situation with @themarkymark, @newsflash, and @xeldal. The current protocol affords no mechanism wherein the innumerable accounts who value marky's contributions can have their voices heard.
A better consensus mechanism for the overall distribution of the reward pool is what I am and will continue vying for. A change to the mechanism so that true consensus can be more readily achieved.
No protocol will be perfect. However, I am convinced that we can do better.
This is consistent with the sentiments @theycallmedan mentioned in this post in August 2021.
I have some additional ideas that I believe will further improve on Dan's proposed Counter-DV concept, which I hope to share soon.
Here are two relevant excerpts from Dan's post:
> While downvotes are necessary for PoB to function in a decentralized way, and by adding 2.5 free downvotes, we have given plenty of ammo to the "good guys" - but inadvertently, we also gave plenty of ammo to the "bad guys." Keep in mind; we are spreading a governance token here; no one large entity should be able to censor governance distribution on a select group of people, IE "targetted bulling" - emotions should never lead to the ability to suffocate another's rewards in perpetuity without a good ability to defend vs. it.
> The main issue is to counter downvote abuse has an opportunity cost to the upvoter trying to help. Under the new flat ruleset of curation rewards, the only thing that can lower your known rate of return is downvotes. Again, asking someone to do good, and in return, they get diluted is not a good business deal, and no one will take it up constantly, nor should they. Good people acting good for the sake of good at the cost of dilution end up becoming irrelevant power-wise; thus, their acts of good are useless in terms of having an effect. We saw what happened when you removed the opportunity cost of downvoting; people used them to help the platform.
>
> So I propose a few options.
>
> One free upvote per day that can only be used on a post that is already downvoted and can't surpass the downvote amount. The post cannot be voted on twice, meaning everyone who voted before the downvote can't revote the post with the free upvote.
>
> For example, say a post is nuked to zero, the exploiter cant use the free upvote because the exploiter already self-voted and cant self-vote the same post twice, so all the bad actors trying to exploit a post cant re-exploit it.
>
> However, if the post is nuked to zero by bad actors, outside good actors can come in and use their free upvote to counter.
>
> A bad actor has no good outside votes, only self-votes; therefore, the only thing that can be downvoted is the attacker's own vote; therefore, they cannot use the free vote to counter. Since the free upvote can only be used on a downvoted post, you can't use it to earn anything, IE it's not like a free spam post upvote per day for attackers.
>
> This is doing the same thing we did with free downvotes except for upvotes; it removes the opportunity cost to reverse downvote abuse. In practice, we know if you let good people do good without being penalized, they will do good.
>
> EDIT* 8/11/21 - thanks to @smooth who rightfully pointed out an obvious attack vector here that I somehow overlooked. "You can split your stake into two accounts, post with both, upvote one post with each account, and then use the other account to counter downvotes." - This makes this defense actually more of an attack vector by giving abusers the ability to recoup losses. - But there may be a way to do it in a different way and accomplish the same goal. Further from smooth: "I think it would be possible to take the downvote curation reward penalty only from those upvotes chronologically before the downvote, so upvotes to counter the downvote wouldn't be penalized."
> If, for whatever reason 'good' or 'bad', they happen not to believe that @themarkymark should receive rewards, it's pretty unlikely that @themarkymark receiving rewards could ever be said to have consensus. You can adjust things around the edges somewhat, but that fundamental fact is hard to avoid.
True. If I adamantly assert that a given post deserves high rewards and you adamantly assert that it deserves zero, then there can NEVER be a true consensus (according to the definition I provided above) on that given post, because I will never 'accept' your desired outcome and you will never accept my desired outcome.
The challenge is, can we adjust the mechanisms to allow 'disputes' such as the one between marky and newsflash/xeldal to be determined more widely rather than just mano-a-mano.
The current system affords supporters of marky only two options: [1] upvote marky's posts and consistently lose curation rewards or [2] employ downvotes against other posts, with the express aim of inflicting curation-rewards damage to the original downvoter(s), to try to dissuade them from persisting in their attacks on marky's posts.
A Counter-DV option (like the one originally suggested by @theycallmedan in the aforementioned post) would allow others to costlessly pile on Counter-DVs (in accordance with and limited by their respective stakes). This might then invite others to pile on DVs. In the end, we get a truly stake-weighted near-consensus on those 'contentious' posts.
My suggestion with respect to Counter-DVs would be to have them either be weaker than DVs and/or less frequent. As such, the total 'value' of DVs able to be implemented would be greater than the total value of Counter-DVs. This allows DVs to be the dominant mechanism for combatting online abuse. However, it provides a mechanism for disagreement over rewards to be more balanced, because stakeholders can costlessly throw their stake into the decision-making process, both for and against rewards going to a single post.
> For what it is worth, number of accounts does not matter at all. A swarm of 10000 low stake bot accounts should have little to no influence. I prefer to speak of stake or some other demonstrably effective reputation mechanism (extremely hard), and not 'accounts'.
Agreed. When I said 'accounts' I was referring to real people with real skin in the game. And stake-weighted skin in the game is as good a 'reputation' metric as any, imho.
The problem with the current system is that those voting 'for' a contentious post (via upvotes) do so at their own loss, whereas those voting 'against' (via DVs) do so at no loss to themselves and force a loss upon their enemies.
We need some balance in this regard.
> If whales upvote and bestow a large windfall on a post (in fact even a single whale can), then it's fitting that other whales can also downvote that same post, no?
Yes, that is fitting, provided there is some community-wide balancing mechanism, rather than a mere unilateral downvote.
Let's consider two extreme cases, under the scenario where Counter-DVs are free and are worth 50% of a full DV, but no self-supporting Counter-DVs are allowed.
First, Alice publishes a one-sentence post saying "Good Morning!" Bob (a whale who knows Alice or maybe is Alice) upvotes the post with his $100 full upvote. Charlie sees this as entirely inappropriate and issues a -$100 full downvote, fully negating Bob's upvote. Bob cannot reverse Charlie's DV, and no one else in the community is willing to support Bob's clearly inappropriate behavior.
Second, Alice publishes a well-written post. Bob (a whale who knows Alice or maybe is Alice) upvotes the post with his $100 full upvote. Charlie sees this as entirely inappropriate and issues a -$100 full downvote, fully negating Bob's upvote. Bob cannot reverse Charlie's DV, but asks for help from the community. Ten accounts see Bob's request but agree with Charlie and pile on an additional -$50 worth of DVs. Twenty accounts agree with Bob and pile on $100 worth of Counter-DVs. The net result is that Charlie's attempt to zero out Bob's upvote on Alice's post was partially effective. Instead of the post receiving $100, it only received $50. However, it took $300 worth of voting stake (Bob's $100 upvote plus the twenty accounts giving $100 in Counter-DVs, which required $200 in combined upvote power) to award Alice $25 in author rewards and Bob $25 in curation rewards (which represent 50% of what Bob would've received had he upvoted a non-contentious post).
Although the second scenario does not technically meet the definition of 'consensus' (because Charlie's plan to zero the post, which he was adamant about, failed, as did Bob's plan to award $50 to Alice and $50 to himself), it is much closer to a 'consensus decision' because it represented the stake-weighted combined actions of 32 accountholders instead of just 2.
To me, this comes much closer to 'consensus decision-making' even though it does not strictly meet the definition of consensus.